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CAN SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
PROVIDE A MEANS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION?
BENJAMIN J RICHARDSON*
The seemingly rapid growth of the market for socially responsible 
investment (‘SRI’) in Australia and other jurisdictions promises to make 
fi nancing decisions more accountable to social and environmental 
criteria. Indeed, the ability of fi nanciers to withhold funds and thereby 
hinder development, such as the decision of the Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd in 2008 to shun fi nancing a Tasmanian 
pulp mill planned by Gunns Ltd, raises hopes that fi nancial institutions 
could act as surrogate environmental regulators. The long-standing SRI 
movement arose partly as an answer to the lacunae or weaknesses of 
offi cial regulation, providing a means by which ethical investors could 
challenge corporations partaking in socially egregious or environmentally 
irresponsible practices condoned by authorities. Yet, these aspirations 
appear to have been too ambitious. Lacking suffi cient market leverage, 
and reliant on relatively tame voluntary codes of conduct, paradoxically 
the success of the SRI movement increasingly relies on the state itself. SRI 
depends on weightier public policy reforms in such areas as economic 
incentives and fi duciary duties, although considerable uncertainty 
persists concerning which policy reforms could most effectively advance 
SRI. Concomitantly, reformers must justify why investment institutions 
should be held legally accountable to a higher standard than those fi rms 
they fi nance. Unless these barriers to SRI and its regulation are resolved, 
it is doubtful whether SRI in Australia or elsewhere can contribute 
signifi cantly to environmental governance.
I    THE ISSUES
Can socially responsible investment (‘SRI’) provide a means of environmental 
regulation, disciplining companies to adhere to higher environmental standards 
as a condition of fi nancing? It has become important to answer this question given 
the seemingly rapid growth of the SRI market in Australia and other countries 
in recent years, coupled with faith among some commentators and investors in 
SRI’s capacity to promote sustainable development. A related pressing question 
is what should be the relationship between the SRI market and regulation, 
including environmental law? If a company is acting in accordance with basic 
∗ Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. I am grateful for the helpful comments provided 
by the anonymous reviewers on an earlier draft of this article.
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environmental legislation, should the legal system concern itself with investors 
wishing to raise the environmental bar?
The fi nancial sector, comprising institutional investors such as superannuation 
plans, as well as retail investors who buy into mutual funds, and the banking 
sector, has not traditionally been seen as relevant to environmental policy. 
Today, the fi nancial sector is attracting growing interest from environmental 
organisations and policymakers in Australia, who are taking a broader and more 
sophisticated view of the economic forces that shape environmental pressures.1 
On the one hand, fi nancial institutions may be viewed as the unseen polluters, 
contributing to environmental problems that they fund and profi t from, yet 
are rarely held directly accountable for. Instead, such problems are habitually 
attributed to the operations of front-line companies. On the other hand, the 
SRI movement promises to catalyse the fi nancial sector into an instrument of 
progressive social and environmental change. Recent developments in Australia 
have drawn attention to these dyadic roles of fi nancial institutions.
One such development was the controversy over whether the Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd (‘ANZ’) would fund Gunns Ltd’s (‘Gunns’) new pulp 
mill in Tasmania. It is worth commenting on this interesting episode. In May 
2008, the ANZ decided not to support the A$1.4 billion pulp mill proposed by 
Gunns, the forestry behemoth.2 Although the ANZ publicly declined to elaborate 
on its reasons for shunning the project,3 it appears that it was partly concerned 
about the environmental sequelae of the project, or at least the negative publicity 
from conservation groups campaigning against the controversial pulp mill.4 
Other fi nancial institutions in Australia such as Perpetual Investments had also 
incurred criticisms for having ties to Gunns.5 Earlier, the ANZ had commissioned 
a technical review of the project, which examined the mill’s environmental 
standards. As a signatory to the Equator Principles,6 an international voluntary 
code of conduct for socially responsible fi nancing, the ANZ had also promised to 
observe high standards of environmental due diligence. Yet, curiously, although 
1 See PricewaterhouseCoopers International Ltd, The Role of Australia’s Financial Sector in 
Sustainability: A Report Prepared for Environment Australia (2001); Donald Ross and Dorothy Wood, 
‘Do Environmental and Social Controls Matter to Australian Capital Investment Decision-making?’ 
(2008) 17 Business Strategy and the Environment 294; Nina Lansbury, Socially Responsible Climate 
Change? Fossil Fuel Investments of the Socially Responsible Investment Industry in Australia (2002) 
Mineral Policy Institute <http://users.nlc.net.au/mpi/rr/docs/sri_climate_change.pdf> at 15 October 
2009.
2 Marian Wilkinson and Ben Cubby, ‘ANZ Exit from Pulp Mill Project Confi rmed’, The Age (Melbourne), 
28 May 2008, 3.
3 Fairfax Digital, ‘ANZ Quiet on Gunns Funding’, Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 22 May 2008 <http://
business.smh.com.au/business/anz-quiet-on-gunns-funding-20080522-2h52.html> at 15 October 2009.
4 Australian Broadcasting Corporation (‘ABC’), ‘Lobby Group Ups Pressure on ANZ’, ABC News 
(Online), 7 April 2008 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/07/2209539.htm> at 15 October 
2009.
5 ABC, ‘Perpetual Investments Chief Sprayed over Gunns Stake’, ABC News (Online), 30 October 2007 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/10/30/2076107.htm> at 15 October 2009.
6 See Equator Principles Financial Institutions (‘EPFI’), The ‘Equator Principles’: A Financial Industry 
Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing Social and Environmental Risk in Project 
Financing (2006) <http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf> at 15 
October 2009.
Monash University Law Review (Vol 35, No 2)264
ANZ declined to fi nance the pulp mill, government authorities had endorsed it 
so long as Gunns complied with relevant environmental and other regulatory 
standards.7
This article is not an in-depth investigation of the fi nancing of the Tasmanian 
pulp mill, although more will be said about it later. Rather, it concentrates on 
the issues of broader signifi cance posed by this episode, particularly whether 
banks and other fi nancial institutions could and should play a greater role in 
safeguarding the environment and promoting clean development. As mechanisms 
of corporate fi nancing, banks and other fi nancial institutions may be strategically 
placed to infl uence development choices and economic trends.8 As shareholders, 
fi nanciers also acquire a voice within corporate governance to leverage change. 
Yet, corporate fi nancing has been viewed in the investment community largely 
as a passive relationship in which fi nancial institutions do not need to consider 
the environmental consequences of projects or companies they support. The 
only signifi cant exception is where their own fi nancial interests are jeopardised. 
They could be threatened if a borrower sinks into insolvency under the weight 
of hefty pollution fi nes, or if a company’s share price dives because of a sullied 
environmental reputation.9 Otherwise, it would appear to be wishful thinking 
to hope that fi nanciers could reliably act as surrogate regulators, using their 
market leverage to improve the environmental quality of economic development. 
Financiers could price themselves out of the market as clients look elsewhere for 
funding from less scrupulous sources.
Financiers’ freedom of action in these respects is also constrained by investment 
laws.10 Superannuation funds, investment companies and other types of fi nanciers 
owe fi duciary duties to their investors, which tend to preclude their putting 
the public interest before the fi nancial interests of their benefi ciary investors. 
Although there is no Australian case law on the issue,11 some British court rulings 
7 On 4 October 2007 the Hon Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, 
approved the pulp mill under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth), subject to Gunns satisfying 48 conditions: Commonwealth of Australia, Approval Decision 
– Gunns Pulp Mill (EPBC 2007/3385) (2007) Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage
and the Arts <http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/notices/assessments/2007/3385/pubs/approval-
decision.pdf> at 17 October 2009. The Tasmanian Government issued its own special permits for the 
pulp mill: Australian Government, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(EPBC Act): Fact Sheet (2008) [2] <http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/pubs/epbc-act-
fact-sheet.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
8 Julie Froud, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams, ‘New Actors in a Financialised Economy and the 
Remaking of Capitalism’ (2007) 12 New Political Economy 339.
9 See Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Project Financing and the Environment: Lender Liability for Environmental 
Damage in Australia’ (1996) 11 Journal of International Banking Law 7.
10 See generally Benjamin J Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen 
Polluters (2008).
11 Academic commentators believe that Australian courts would follow English law on this point: see 
Andrew Leigh, ‘“Caveat Investor”: The Ethical Investment of Superannuation in Australia’ (1997) 
25 Australian Business Law Review 341, 347-8; Paul Ali and Martin Gold, An Appraisal of Socially 
Responsible Investments and Implications for Trustees and Other Investment Fiduciaries (2002) [15] 
<http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/research-papers/Monograph%20Series/SRI%20fi nal%20report.pdf> 
at 15 October 2009.
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such as in Cowan v Scargill,12 and other cases,13 suggest investment institutions 
would be liable to their benefi ciaries if they recklessly sacrifi ce fi nancial returns 
at the altar of ethical causes.14 While the directors of a bank do not owe similar 
fi duciary duties to the bank’s depositors, they are legally accountable to the 
bank and its shareholders to act fi nancially prudently.15 Other legal obstacles 
to environmentally-enlightened fi nancing include the diffi culties the system of 
corporate governance poses to altruistic, Ralph Nader-style shareholder activism 
from within.16 Superannuants are often in no better position to infl uence the 
investment policy of their pension fund, being largely relegated into a passive role 
by fi duciary law principles that assume only trustees can speak on their behalf.17 
Also, international and domestic fi nancial regulation contains virtually no rules 
to address the environmental pressures that arise from fi nancial markets, as the 
regulatory system attributes the environmental costs of damaging activities to 
the front-line companies, for regulation at an operational level through separate 
environmental laws.18
Despite such obstacles, in recent decades a movement for SRI has swept 
international fi nancial markets including Australia, raising the spectre of a 
more enlightened approach to fi nancing not predicated on maximising fi nancial 
returns.19 Its proponents include pension plans promoting sustainable, long-
term investment, mutual funds selling SRI portfolios to the general public, and 
banks requiring their borrowers to minimise the environmental degradation of 
fi nanced projects.20 SRI came to prominence in the 1980s during the campaign 
led by religious investors to divest from South Africa then under the apartheid 
regime. After a lull during the 1990s, SRI has taken off again. The most recent 
survey, published in November 2008 for the Responsible Investment Association 
Australasia, valued Australian SRI portfolios at approximately A$15.7 billion, 
representing 1.9 percent of all managed investment portfolios in the country.21 
By comparison, in 2000 these SRI portfolios were only worth a paltry A$325 
12 [1985] 1 Ch 270.
13 Martin v City of Edinburgh District Council [1988] SLT 329; Harries v Church Commissioners for 
England [1992] 1 WLR 1241.
14 See Rosy Thornton, ‘Ethical Investments: A Case of Disjointed Thinking’ (2008) 67 Cambridge Law 
Journal 396.
15 John Glover, ‘Banks and Fiduciary Relationships’ (1995) 7 Bond Law Review 50.
16 Ruth Aguilera et al, ‘Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A Comparative Analysis of the 
UK and the US’ (2006) 14 C orporate Governance: An International Review 147.
17 Gregory Alexander, ‘Pensions and Passivity’ (1993) 56 Law and Contemporary Problems 111. Note, 
however, that Australia’s Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) does mandate some 
limited member representation on trustee boards of funds.
18 On fi nancial markets regulation, see Peter Spencer, The Structure and Regulation of Financial Markets 
(2002); John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000).
19 Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (2002).
20 See Marcel Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the 
Planet (2001); Sonia Labatt and Rodney White, Environmental Finance: A Guide to Environmental Risk 
Assessment and Financial Products (2002).
21 Cor porate Monitor, Responsible Investment 2008: A Benchmark Report on Australia and New Zealand 
by the Responsible Investment Association Australasia (2008) 15.
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million.22 Public opinion surveys in Australia also suggest rising popular 
sentiment in favour of more ethical investment choices.23
Concomitantly, a plethora of international SRI codes of conduct has been drafted, 
often advanced by the investment community itself. These include the Equator 
Principles, the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (‘UNPRI’),24 
and the United Nations Environment Program’s Finance Initiative (‘UNEP FI’).25 
Many Australian fi nanciers have signed up to these codes of conduct.26 This 
ensemble of quasi, ‘soft’ regulation is furnishing both normative standards and 
procedures for more transparent and accountable fi nancial decisions.27 A venerable 
feature of these mechanisms is that they can apply to multi-jurisdictional contexts 
and target fi nancial institutions operating in global markets.28
This article thus seeks to resolve debates about SRI’s capacity to provide a means of 
environmental regulation, and the rationale for such an approach, with particular 
reference to SRI in Australia. The fi rst half of the article examines the capacity 
of SRI to leverage change in corporate environmental behaviour, and argues 
that on several grounds its capacity to act as a means of governance is presently 
rather limited. Most of the remaining part of the article explores the relationship 
between SRI and law, and it advances an argument that investors should be 
held legally accountable for environmental problems associated with corporate 
fi nancing. The concluding section sketches some ideas for legal reform of the SRI 
market, highlighting the importance of institutional investors’ fi duciary duties. 
Throughout the discussion, theoretical and empirical perspectives from a range 
of disciplines apart from law are canvassed. The SRI market and its governance 
cannot be meaningfully analysed from the narrow lens of legal doctrine alone.
22 Ibid 16.
23 See, eg, Mark Watmore and Leanne Bradley, The Rothschild Report: Ethical Investing, A Study 
into Current Perceptions (2001). Some more recent surveys in other jurisdictions point to growing 
interest in SRI: F&C Asset Management, Research Commissioned by F&C Asset Management into 
the Ethical Investment Concerns of the UK Public (2006); CNW Group, ‘Canadians Weigh Social and 
Environmental Factors in Investment Decisions, Investors Group Research Finds’, Canada Newswire, 
6 November 2007 <http://www.cnw.ca/en/releases/archive/November2007/05/c3691.html> at 15 
October 2009.
24 See Principles of Responsible Investment (‘PRI’) Secretariat, Principles of Responsible Investment 
(2009) PRI <http://www.unpri.org/principles/> at 15 October 2009.
25 See United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (‘UNEP FI’), UNEP Finance Initiative 
(2009) UNEP FI <http://www.unepfi .org> at 15 October 2009.
26 Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 20-1.
27 See Kate Miles, ‘Targeting Financiers: Can Voluntary Codes of Conduct for the Investment and 
Financing Sectors Achieve Environmental and Sustainability Objectives?’ in Nathalie Chalifour et al 
(eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation: International and Comparative Perspectives Volume 
V (2008) 947; Oren Perez, ‘The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-regulation to Multi-polar 
Governance’ in Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg and Gerd Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Self-
governance and Law in Transnational Economic Transactions (2008) 151.
28 Robert Falkner, ‘Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links’ 
(2003) 3 Global Environmental Politics 72.
Can Socially Responsible Investment Provide a Means of Environmental Regulation? 267
II    SRI AS A MEANS OF GOVERNANCE?
A    Introduction
The recent ascendancy of SRI has occurred largely without offi cial imprimatur, 
yet, as will be argued, its future growth and effectiveness is likely to depend 
on regulatory intervention from the state. The argument in this section of the 
paper focuses on three critical problems with the SRI market, which cast serious 
doubts on its ability to provide an effective means of controlling the social and 
environmental behaviour of fi nancial markets. First, for various reasons, the SRI 
movement has increasingly shunned ethical arguments in favour of a business 
case for responsible fi nancing. It promises to make investors prosperous, rather 
than merely virtuous. By making social and environmental activism conditional 
on furthering the ‘bottom line’, SRI has blunted its critical strength because, inter 
alia, there often remains a countervailing business case for fi nancing socially 
irresponsible activities. Second, as corporate fi nance theory predicts, the SRI 
market generally lacks the ability to infl uence the cost of capital of fi rms, and 
thereby give green companies a tangible market advantage over polluting rivals. 
Even the shift to business case motivations has failed to transform signifi cantly 
SRI’s stunted leverage. Third, the efforts of the SRI movement to develop its own 
codes of conduct, such as the Equator Principles or the UNPRI, have resulted in 
relatively facile standards that fall well short of moving the fi nancial community 
beyond business-as-usual.
B    SRI’s Morph from the Ethical to the Business Case
SRI’s philosophical motivations have altered dramatically in the last decade 
without commensurately enhancing its capacity to leverage improved corporate 
behaviour. Having evolved from its traditions of religious-based, limited-issue 
activism, which began with the Quakers in the 18th century, the modern era of SRI 
arose in the late 1960s in the wake of opposition to corporate ties to the Vietnam 
War29 and South Africa’s apartheid regime.30 SRI now spans a broad constellation 
of fi nancial actors campaigning on a potpourri of social and environmental 
causes.31 It champions issues as diverse as animal welfare, aboriginal rights and 
mitigating climate change. While there is no authoritative agreement in the market 
on what qualifi es as ‘SRI’, it has become widely recognised as primarily a means 
to further environmentally sustainable development, or ‘sustainability’, as the 
concept is often known.32 Yet, as with the contested sustainability discourse, the 
29 Michele Micheletti, Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action 
(2003) 104-5.
30 Malek Lashgari and David Gant, ‘Social Investing: The Sullivan Principles’ (1989) 47 Review of Social 
Economy 74.
31 Russell Sparkes, ‘A Historical Perspective on the Growth of Socially Responsible Investment’ in 
Rodney Sullivan and Craig Mackenzie (eds), Responsible Investment (2006) 39.
32 For an early perspective, see Susan Meeker-Lowry, Economics as if the Earth Really Mattered: A 
Catalyst Guide to Socially Conscious Investing (1988).
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motivations to incorporate environmental considerations in investment decisions 
are diverse. The dominant motivation in SRI has become a business case, on the 
assumption that SRI can give investors a fi nancial advantage. This stance has 
come at the expense of a greatly diminished, ethically-based boutique sector.
Let us look at the latter style of SRI fi rst, as historically SRI was typically 
understood nobly as ‘ethical investment’. While ethical approaches to investment 
were mainly based on deontological ethics (focusing on the rightness or 
wrongness of an act), presently they are commonly associated with teleological 
ethics (focusing on the consequences of a particular action).33 An example of the 
former approach is investors not wishing to profi t from ‘sinful’ activities, such 
as gambling or pornography. Conversely, the latter style of ethical investment 
is promoted to leverage change in the environmental or social behaviour of 
companies. It does not ignore the ‘bottom line’, yet expects consideration of 
ethical issues for their own sake, and not only for fi nancial benefi t. It presumes 
that an individual or organisation remains moral when faced with any decision, 
including a fi nancial one.34
Ethical investment is commonly associated with religious institutions.35 They 
exploited their fi nancial resources to campaign against the former apartheid 
regime in South Africa. This divestment campaign was motivated not by a desire 
to reap a fi nancial advantage, but because morally it was perceived as the just 
course of action. Today, some faith-based investors continue to champion the 
moral high-ground, such as the United States-based Interfaith Center for Corporate 
Responsibility’s campaigns on climate change and environmental justice.36 
Outside of the religious sector, ethically-motivated investors are sometimes found 
among community-based credit unions (for example, Canada’s Vancouver City 
Savings Credit Union), in the banking sector (for example, the Cooperative Bank, 
in the United Kingdom)37 and some investment companies that screen rigorously 
on ethical criteria (for example, the Australian Ethical Investment Ltd).38
Ethical considerations evidently do not weigh greatly on the SRI calculations of 
institutional investors. Institutions that invest on behalf of thousands of investors 
would likely dismiss calls that they should choose investments on ethical 
grounds, contending that, as their fund members likely hold diverse ethical 
views on social and environmental issues, it would be impossible to achieve a 
33 Neil Carter and Megan Huby, ‘Ecological Citizenship and Ethical Investment’ (2005) 14 Environmental 
Politics 255; Paul Dembinski et al, ‘The Ethical Foundations of Responsible Investment’ (2003) 48 
Journal of Business Ethics 203.
34 Wesley Cragg, ‘Business Ethics and Stakeholder Theory’ (2002) 12 Business Ethics Quarterly 113.
35 Paola Triolo, Martin Palmer and Steve Waygood, A Capital Solution: Faith, Finance and Concern for a 
Living Planet (2000) 26-53.
36 See Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Working Groups: Global Warming: Goals & 
Objectives (2004) <http://www.iccr.org/issues/globalwarm/goalsobjectives.php> at 15 October 2009.
37 See The Co-operative Bank, The Co-operative Bank (2009) <http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk> at 15 
October 2009; UmweltBank, UmweltBank (2009) <http://www.umweltbank.de> at 15 October 2009.
38 See Australian Ethical Investment Ltd, Rigorous Ethical Screening (2009) <http://www.australianethical.
com.au/our-approach> at 15 October 2009.
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consensus of values to guide fi nancial decision-making.39 This stance seemingly 
relegates ethics to a subjective, personal taste, compared with the supposed hard 
objectivity of fi nancial returns. Alternatively, the maximisation of fi nancial 
returns is considered by investment institutions as a clear and easily measurable 
benchmark to which they should be held accountable.40 The dominant style of 
contemporary SRI is thus driven by a business case, which scrutinises the social, 
environmental and corporate governance issues not because they are viewed 
as intrinsically signifi cant, but primarily because they can affect the fi nancial 
condition of companies. In business parlance, such factors garner attention when 
considered to be fi nancially ‘material’, involving additional fi nancial risks or 
investment opportunities.41
Evidence of this changing SRI discourse is readily found. Symbolically, in 
2007 Australia’s peak SRI industry association changed its name from the 
‘Ethical Investment Association’ to the ‘Responsible Investment Association 
Australasia’.42 The connotation is that ‘responsible investment’ is a more neutral 
term without the political and moral connotations of ‘ethical’ investment. The 
infl uential UNEP FI, which is an industry partnership coordinated by the United 
Nations to promote SRI, downplays ethical arguments. In its report, Show Me the 
Money, UNEP FI explains that ‘[t]he fi rst – and arguably for investors the most 
important – reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more money’.43 
Another UNEP FI report cautions investment analysts to ‘[c]ommunicate on 
issue-specifi c, proven, quantifi able, material links to business value; [and to] 
avoid moral arguments’.44 In contrast to the assertive divestment campaigns and 
confrontational shareholder activism of earlier forms of SRI, business case SRI 
is typically implemented through light-touch screens fi ltering only the most 
pernicious companies from an investment portfolio, polite engagement with 
corporate management, and more sophisticated fi nancial evaluations of the risks 
and profi table opportunities inhering in corporate social and environmental 
behaviour. Aggressive shareholder advocacy and strict ethical screens are tactics 
rarely found among mainstream ‘responsible’ investors.
At fi rst glance, then, by seeking to conceptualise environmental and social issues 
in the market’s own logic, business case SRI promisingly provides a solution to 
the movement’s historical marginalisation. Thus, environmental issues such as 
biodiversity conservation and climate change may come to resonate with greater 
39 Interview with staff, Responsible Investment Association Australasia, 11 December 2005.
40 See Luc Renneboog, Jenke Ter Horst and Chendi Zhang, ‘Socially Responsible Investments: Institutional 
Aspects, Performance, and Investor Behavior’ (2008) 32 Journal of Banking and Finance 1723.
41 UNEP FI, The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate Governance Issues in Equity Pricing 
(2004).
42 See Responsible Investment Association Australasia (‘RIAA’), About RIAA (2009) <http://www.
responsibleinvestment.org/html/s02_article/article_view.asp?id=462&nav_cat_id=233&nav_top_
id=89> at 15 October 2009.
43 UNEP FI, Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and Governance Issues to Company 
Value, Report (2006) 4.
44 UNEP FI, Generation Lost: Young Financial Analysts and Environmental, Social and Governance 
Issues: Executive Summary (2004) 5.
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signifi cance in investment decision-making as issues with material fi nancial 
consequences.
However, for several reasons, the business case is not a complete answer to 
the barriers to SRI; indeed, if there was a clear business case for investing 
responsibly, why would we ever need corrective environmental regulation, let 
alone a movement for SRI? A primary blind spot with business case SRI is that, 
unless social and environmental issues are perceived to have tangible fi nancial 
implications, investors may ignore them. Often they are perceived as too nebulous 
for workable fi nancial quantifi cation.45 Values such as biodiversity or climate 
integrity cannot be captured by conventional fi nancial accounting systems unless 
they give rise to specifi c expenses, income or fi nancial risks attributable to an 
individual organisation.46 Sometimes ‘reputational risks’ associated with unethical 
practices may be of suffi cient consequence to fi nanciers to motivate action.47 Yet, 
reputational risk to fi nanciers is not an echo for all underlying societal concerns, 
as sometimes the most disadvantaged groups and victims of environmental 
hardship lack the means to publicise their plight. The second ingrained problem 
is that often there remains a countervailing business case for environmental 
pillage. For example, despite the SRI industry’s rhetoric about climate change 
risks, the fossil fuel industry has hardly changed. The continuing investment 
in Canada’s oil sands is one controversial example.48 The profi t to be made by 
exploiting Australia’s old-growth forests is another.49 Without an additional layer 
of ethical responsibility, fi nanciers may lack the incentive to take actions beyond 
those prescribed by an orthodox business case. The third limitation is that, while 
the SRI community increasingly argues that there is a ‘long-term’ business case 
for investing responsibly on such issues as climate change, the problem is that 
market pressures to act for the short-term readily trump any perceived long-term 
costs and benefi ts that are discounted considerably. For example, the incentive 
system for fund managers greatly hinders their willingness to move their focus 
beyond short-term performance and market valuations.50
Beyond the perverse incentives individual fi nanciers face to investing responsibly, 
collective action problems also hinder SRI. The fi nancial market overall contains 
no mechanism to scale the economy within ecosystem-based limits, such as by 
45 Susan McGeachie, Michael Kiernan and Eric Kirzner, Finance and the Environment in North America: 
The State of Play of the Integration of Environmental Issues into Financial Research: Executive 
Summary (2005) 57.
46 Susannah Goodman and Tim Little, The Gap in GAAP: An Examination of Environmental Accounting 
Loopholes (2003).
47 Somewhere between 50-70 percent of large companies’ economic value is reportedly intangible, tied up 
in their brand name and goodwill: Noel Purcell, ‘The Other ROI – The Responsibility of Investment’ 
(Speech delivered at the UNEP FI Global Roundtable, Melbourne, 24-25 October 2007). 
48 Kirk Makin, ‘High-stakes Battle Looms over Oil-sands Pollution’, The Globe Mail (Canada), 15 August 
2007, A1.
49 Robert Gale, ‘Old Growth Logging: Does It Matter if Environmental Protection Costs Jobs? (2005) 1 
International Journal of Environment, Workplace and Employment 203.
50 Carmen Juravle and Alan Lewis, ‘Identifying Impediments to SI in Europe: A Review of the Practitioner 
and Academic Literature’ (2008) 17 Business Ethics: A European Review 285, 290.
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restraining pollution within the assimilative capacity of the environment.51 In the 
absence of regulatory restraints, such as a legislative cap on an economy’s carbon 
emissions, environmentally-conscious investment institutions face steep hurdles 
to working collectively to moderate economic growth imperatives. Further, 
because such institutions commonly act through intermediaries such as fund 
managers, who are hired on limited-term contracts with frequent performance 
evaluations, even the most enlightened fund geared to sustainable, long-term 
investment can readily succumb to myopic fi nancing practices.52
Given these and other limitations, as the following section will show, neither 
business nor ethical compulsions have so far proved adequate to allow SRI to 
dominate the market.
C    SRI’s Muted Market Leverage
Despite some contrary rhetorical claims in the academic and popular press,53 SRI 
remains largely a boutique, niche sector. Precisely quantifying the SRI market 
is not easy, because existing surveys use inconsistent methodologies, indicative 
of the underlying lack of an objective basis to defi ning SRI. Research in North 
America and Western Europe by the leading SRI industry groups suggests that 
SRI probably accounts for below 10 percent of the investment markets in these 
regions.54 Much research appears to exaggerate the extent of SRI; for instance, 
the US surveys treat as ‘SRI’ any fund that ethically screens merely against one 
activity, such as tobacco stocks, while counting its entire investment portfolio, 
which otherwise resembles any regular fund.55 International research on the 
banking sector also indicates cause for concern, with one 2006 study concluding 
that ‘with few exceptions bank policies are lagging signifi cantly behind relevant 
international standards and best practices’.56
Likewise, while the SRI market in Australia has apparently blossomed in recent 
years, it remains small in absolute terms. According to the most recent survey, as 
previously noted, the ‘core’ assets of retail and institutional SRI as at 30 June 2008 
amounted to only about A$15.7 billion.57 Taking into account the additional value 
of fi nanciers’ corporate engagement to promote social and environmental issues, 
51 Herman Daly, ‘Allocation, Distribution and Scale: Towards an Economics That Is Effi cient, Just and 
Sustainable’ (1992) 6 Ecological Economics 185.
52 See Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2nd ed, 2005).
53 See, eg, Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2010: The Rise of Conscious Capitalism (2005) 140; Tavia 
Grant, ‘Social Investment Assets Soar’, The Globe and Mail (Canada), 22 March 2007, B17.
54 Social Investment Forum (‘SIF’), 2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United 
States (2008); Eurosif, Socially Responsible Investment among European Institutional Investors (2006).
55 SIF, 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States: A 10-year Review 
(2006) 9.
56 Worldwide Fund for Nature and BankTrack, Shaping the Future of Sustainable Finance: Moving from 
Paper Promises to Performance (2006) 4. See also International Finance Corporation, Banking on 
Sustainability: Financing Environmental and Social Opportunities in Emerging Markets (2007).
57 Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 4-5. See also the earlier study (a survey of SRI funds in Australia): 
Total Environment Centre, Socially Responsible Investment: Assessing the Non-fi nancial Performance 
of Companies (2002). 
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and improved fi nancial analysis of social and environmental considerations, the 
‘broad’ SRI market in Australia was estimated by that survey to be about A$58 
billion.58 By market share, these fi gures amount to somewhere between 2 and 5 
percent of the Australian fi nancial economy.59
Such a market, even if doubled or tripled to allow generously for any miscalculations, 
is vastly insuffi cient to enable SRI to infl uence signifi cantly the behaviour of 
companies. Yet, proponents of SRI contend that it fi nancially rewards ethical fi rms 
by additional investment, while punishing unethical fi rms through divestment and 
thereby higher costs of raising capital.60 Presumably, affected fi rms would then 
be motivated to reform their policies, making them more attractive to SRI-driven 
fi nanciers. These effects are also related to social investors’ desire, as discussed 
shortly, to benefi t fi nancially from their ‘ethical’ investments.61
Modern corporate fi nance theory doubts that SRI can change corporate conduct 
while benefi ting investors fi nancially.62 Modern portfolio theory holds that a 
diversifi ed investment universe is more likely to produce optimal, risk-adjusted 
returns than a narrowly constructed portfolio.63 Exclusionary ethical screens that 
reduce the investment universe should increase risks and thereby ultimately hurt 
returns.64 Even if markets in the real world do not necessarily behave as theory 
predicts, as some commentators plausibly contend,65 SRI may not necessarily 
enjoy an advantage because an ineffi cient market may under- or over-rate both 
ethical and unethical businesses equally.66 While much empirical research 
suggests that risk-adjusted returns for SRI portfolios do not generally under-
perform the market,67 there may be a simple explanation. As Haigh and Hazelton 
explain: ‘The reason for correlations between the performance of conventional 
and SRI funds may be that the portfolios of SRI funds are not markedly different 
to those of conventional mutual funds’.68 In other words, SRI is likely to be too 
inclusive, screening out a lone tobacco producer, but otherwise investing as usual.
58 Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 4-5.
59 Ibid.
60 Harrison Hong and Marcin Kacperczyk, ‘The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets’ 
(Working Paper, Princeton University and University of British Columbia, 2006); Russell Sparkes and 
Christopher Cowton, ‘The Maturing of Socially Responsible Investment: A Review of the Developing 
Link with Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2004) 52 Journal of Business Ethics 45.
61 Peter Camejo (ed), The SRI Advantage: Why Socially Responsible Investing Has Outperformed 
Financially (2002).
62 John Langbein and Richard Posner, ‘Social Investing and the Law of Trusts’ (1980) 79 Michigan Law 
Review 72; Michael Knoll, ‘Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Confl icting Claims 
Underlying Socially Responsible Investment’ (2002) 57 Business Lawyer 681.
63 Harry Markowitz, ‘Portfolio Selection’ (1952) 7 Journal of Finance 77. Returns, for instance, include 
dividends paid by fi rms as well as appreciation of the fi rms’ stock prices.
64 Andrew Rudd, ‘Social Responsibility and Portfolio Performance’ (1981) 23 California Management 
Review 55.
65 See, eg, Ray Ball, ‘The Theory of Stock Market Effi ciency: Accomplishments and Limitations’ (1995) 
30 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4.
66 Knoll, above n 62, 706.
67 UNEP FI and Mercer Consulting, Demystifying Responsible Investment Performance: A Review of Key 
Academic and Broker Research on ESG Factors (2007).
68 Matthew Haigh and James Hazelton, ‘Financial Markets: A Tool for Social Responsibility?’ (2004) 52 
Journal of Business Ethics 59, 65.
Can Socially Responsible Investment Provide a Means of Environmental Regulation? 273
A second fundamental problem with SRI is its present limited ability to infl uence 
the cost of capital. Finance theory implies that social investors are price takers, 
not price makers. Certainly, corporations’ need to raise funds is a crucial variable, 
as ‘SRI is more likely to be relevant whenever companies are heavily dependent 
on the stock market as a fi nancing instrument’.69 Corporate fi nancing data suggest 
that most companies, especially well-established fi rms, are able to self-fi nance 
their operations and some growth through operational revenue rather than by 
borrowing or issuing bonds or new stock.70 However, even mature companies are 
not entirely insulated from the demands of investors.71 They have reasons to be 
mindful of their stock price even when not issuing new stock to raise capital. For 
instance, a declining stock price can affect a fi rm’s market capitalisation and thus 
stock market listing. Also, corporate managements’ remuneration is often tied 
to stock options, giving management incentives to adopt measures to keep stock 
prices high.
Conventional fi nance theory suggests that investors can trade any quantity of 
a fi rm’s shares without affecting its price.72 Supposedly this is because in an 
effi cient equity market, where demand for a company’s stock is almost perfectly 
elastic,73 the price of a stock simply refl ects the expected future cash fl ows, and all 
informed investors value the company’s stock at the same price.74 As shareholder 
divestment by SRI funds does not change the expected cash fl ow from the fi rm’s 
activities, its stock prices therefore should not yield.75 Only if potential traders 
believe the sale or purchase of stock refl ects a downward or upward view of the 
company’s underlying fi nancial prospects would the stock price vary signifi cantly. 
Business case SRI that educates the market to the fi nancial consequences of 
fi rms’ environmental behaviour may have such an effect. It is when SRI views 
unethical behaviour differently from the market as a whole that it may not 
infl uence economic fundamentals, and thus corporate behaviour.
Other theoretical research that takes a more granular perspective of capital markets, 
and does not assume that markets always behave according to textbook theory, 
predicts that SRI can alter the cost of capital when the stock is risky, unique, or is 
69 Andrea Beltratti, ‘Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium’ (Working Paper No 93, 
Bocconi University, 2003) 21.
70 Jenny Corbett and Tim Jenkinson, ‘The Financing of Industry, 1970-1989: An International Comparison’ 
(1996) 10 Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 71. Cf Andreas Hackethal and Reinhard 
Schmidt, ‘Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results’ (Working Paper No 125, 
University of Frankfurt, 2003).
71 Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, ‘CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much You Pay, but How’ (1990) 
68 Harvard Business Review 138.
72 Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance (2005) 90-5 passim.
73 Claudio Loderer, John Cooney and Leonard van Drunen, ‘The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common 
Stock’ (1991) 46 Journal of Finance 621. In contrast, for an asset that is relatively unique and has few 
close substitutes, the demand curve should be steep and less elastic.
74 Glen Arnold, The Handbook of Corporate Finance: A Business Companion to Financial Markets, 
Decisions and Techniques (2005) 314, 330.
75 Wallace Davidson, Dan Worell and Abuzar El-Jelly, ‘Infl uencing Managers to Change Unpopular 
Corporate Behavior through Boycotts and Divestitures’ (1995) 34 Business and Society 171.
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traded in small, restrictive markets.76 Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner have developed 
a theoretical model of corporate environmental responsibility, which predicts that 
SRI investors will need to hold at least 20 percent of the market in order to lower 
the cost of capital suffi ciently to induce a business to invest in environmental 
improvements.77 Other researchers suggest a much higher market share, although 
even 20 percent greatly exceeds the size of the SRI market presently.78
The foregoing discussion, relating to equity investors, is not necessarily applicable 
to debt fi nancing such as the situation involving the ANZ and Gunns. Banks can 
exert relatively more infl uence over borrowers, especially small enterprises that 
have fewer fi nancing options, as well as fi rms seeking large project fi nancing 
loans.79 Gunns, for example, sought nearly A$1.5 billion for its Tasmanian pulp 
mill, more than the market capitalisation value of the forestry company.80 Self-
interested risk mitigation principally motivates lenders to follow environmental 
due diligence in scrutinising prospective borrowers. Lenders may adjust the cost 
of a loan to refl ect any residual environmental risks, requiring the borrower to 
adopt specifi c environmental safeguards, or demanding more valuable security 
relative to the value of the loan.81 But in a competitive credit market, lenders 
also have incentives not to raise the bar too high for risk of losing clients to less 
scrupulous lenders.
Hard evidence regarding the impact of SRI in the equity and debt fi nancing 
markets generally does not support the claim that SRI leverages change. The 
most comprehensive studied action is the South African boycott, and much 
research suggests that the divestment campaign has had limited effect on the 
economic performance of targeted companies.82 The signifi cant divestment from 
the tobacco industry in the wake of a spate of litigation against tobacco fi rms also 
appears to have had a muted effect on their stock prices.83 Other research that 
has investigated changes to the cost of capital in light of new market information 
about fi rms’ environmental behaviour, such as news of an environmental scandal, 
pollution fi nes or, conversely, commendations for environmental achievements, 
76 Pietra Rivoli, ‘Making a Difference or Making a Statement? Finance Research and Socially Responsible 
Investment’ (2003) 13 Business Ethics Quarterly 271.
77 Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus and Josef Zechner, ‘The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate Behavior’ 
(2001) 36 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 431.
78 James Angel and Pietra Rivoli, ‘Does Ethical Investing Impose a Cost upon the Firm? A Theoretical 
Perspective’ (1997) 6 Journal of Investing 57.
79 Jeucken, above n 20; Paul Thompson, ‘Bank Lending and the Environment: Policies and Opportunities’ 
(1998) 16 International Journal of Bank Marketing 243.
80 Its market capitalisation was A$1.2 billion in September 2007: John Durie, ‘Gunns in a Bet-the-
Company Project’, The Australian (Sydney), 18 September 2007, 40.
81 Ibid.
82 Siew Teoh, Ivo Welch and Paul Wazzan, ‘The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the 
Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott’ (1999) 72 Journal of Business 35. Cf 
Raman Kumar, William Lamb and Richard Wokutch, ‘The End of South African Sanctions, Institutional 
Ownership, and the Stock Price Performance of Boycotted Firms’ (2002) 41 Business and Society 133.
83 Tom Burroughes, ‘Ethical Investors Losing out as Tobacco Stocks Burn up Britain’s Equity Markets’, 
The Business (United Kingdom), 24 February 2007.
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suggests such factors could affect stock prices or the cost of borrowing.84 However, 
the market impact tends to be short-lived.85
Research on shareholder advocacy, a seminal means of SRI, provides another 
way to map the impact of SRI. Social investors sometimes choose to infl uence 
laggards by dialogue and exerting pressure from within, rather than by divestment. 
Institutional investors are widely known as passive investors, lacking knowledge 
and incentives to monitor companies because of the costs involved and diffi culties 
of coordinating action.86 Where they do engage with companies out of social or 
environmental concerns, as some commentators believe they increasingly do,87 
their impact appears episodic and fl eeting. Shareholder advocacy is predominantly 
a North American tradition, and is not widely practised among Australian social 
investors. The 2008 survey of the Australian SRI market noted forlornly that 
‘for the last 3 years, and again in 2008, there have been no specifi c shareholder 
resolutions that related to an issue of environmental or social responsibility’.88
Shareholder activism initiated by environmental groups in Australia arose in the 
late 1990s.89 One early example occurred in September 1999 when the Wilderness 
Society Inc (‘WSI’) sought to hinder Wesfarmers’ logging of old-growth forests 
in Western Australia. Purchasing a small batch of shares in the company, the 
WSI then led a coalition of disaffected shareholders in petitioning the board of 
Wesfarmers to hold an extraordinary general meeting to consider a shareholder 
resolution. Yet, as has typically happened to such SRI-driven resolutions in 
Australia, 98 percent of the Wesfarmers shareholders voted against the WSI’s 
proposal that asked the company to conduct more rigorous environmental 
assessments of its logging operations.90 Nonetheless, the WSI has continued 
to harness shareholder pressure as one of its campaign tactics, including as a 
means of challenging Gunns’s proposed pulp mill in Tasmania. Attempting to 
infl uence the ANZ Bank when it was contemplating fi nance for the project, the 
84 Nathan Lorraine, David Collison and David Power, ‘An Analysis of the Stock Market Impact 
of Environmental Performance Information’ (2004) 28 Accounting Forum 7; Susmita Dasgupta, 
Benoît Laplante and Nlandu Mamingi, ‘Capital Market Responses to Environmental Performance in 
Developing Countries’ (Working Paper No 1909, World Bank, 1998); James Hamilton, ‘Pollution as 
News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data’ (1995) 28 Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 98.
85 Denis Cormier, Michel Magnan and Bernard Morard, ‘The Impact of Corporate Pollution on Market 
Valuation: Some Empirical Evidence’ (1993) 8 Ecological Economics 135; Mark White, ‘Investor 
Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill’ (Working Paper, University of Virginia, 1995).
86 John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1995) 
168-9.
87 Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson, The New Capitalists: How Citizen Investors Are 
Reshaping the Corporate Agenda (2006) 15-16.
88 Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 23.
89 See Shelley Bielefeld et al, ‘Directors’ Duties to the Company and Minority Shareholder Environmental 
Activism’ (2004) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 28.
90 Kirsten Anderson and Ian Ramsay, ‘From the Picketline to the Boardroom: Union Shareholder Activism 
in Australia’ (Research Report, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of 
Melbourne, 2005) 9-10.
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WSI issued an ‘Open Letter to ANZ Shareholders’ calling for an extraordinary 
general meeting to discuss actions to address the environmental issues at stake.91
Although SRI-inspired shareholder resolutions rarely garner more than 10 
percent of votes cast,92 sometimes defeated shareholder resolutions may induce 
management to work cooperatively, as they may interpret even modest dissenting 
votes as refl ective of broader unease about company policies and decisions. Apart 
from formal resolutions, investors may favour informal corporate engagement to 
infl uence management, although its extent and impact by its very nature is much 
harder to gauge.
Overall, SRI is yet to transform fi nancial markets and the companies they 
fi nance. Certainly, more capital now fl ows into self-proclaimed SRI funds than 
has occurred historically. Some investors are becoming more active shareholders, 
and markets increasingly heed corporate environmental performance when it is 
perceived as fi nancially salient. SRI has generally not yet had the strength of 
a surrogate regulator, able to impose on companies a separate market licence 
to operate. Indeed, business case-driven SRI appears to rely on the underlying 
system of environmental regulation to alter the fi nancial advantages between 
polluters and socially responsible fi rms.
Because the SRI market is likely to be much smaller than industry surveys 
suggest, its capacity to engineer change by raising the cost of fi nance for polluters 
or pressuring for change through shareholder activism, has been limited. 
Regulatory and public policy changes are therefore probably essential to improve 
the quality and extent of SRI. However, the SRI movement itself has not greatly 
clamoured for such reforms, preferring instead to draft its own codes of conduct 
for fi nanciers to adopt voluntarily. The following discussion will concentrate on 
one of these codes, the Equator Principles.
D    Market-based SRI Standards and Codes
1    Overview
Contemporary SRI is more than just a label to describe certain fi nancial 
transactions that are socially or environmentally sensitive. The SRI sector has also 
fashioned its own codes of conduct and standards to help coordinate, standardise 
and facilitate responsible fi nancing. These voluntary mechanisms developed by 
market and civil society institutions, which have proliferated greatly since 2000, 
are attracting considerable interest in the fi nancial community.93
This web of SRI governance spans a diversity of methods, structures and 
objectives, which we can broadly categorise into four types, although any 
91 Wilderness Society Inc, ‘Open Letter to ANZ Shareholders: Gunns’ Proposed Pulp Mill’ <http://
tasmaniantimes.com/images/uploads/Open_letter_to_ANZ_shareholders.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
92 Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 23.
93 Perez, above n 27; Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational 
Governance of Socially Responsible Investment’ (2006) 17 Yearbook of International Environmental 
Law 73.
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individual mechanism may contain elements of each type. First, there are 
normative frameworks that enunciate substantive principles and guidance on 
desirable performance. They include the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial 
Institutions94 and the UNPRI.95 Process standards enabling the assessment, 
verifi cation and communication of performance constitute another form of 
governance. These include the Equator Principles96 and the Global Reporting 
Initiative.97 They do not dictate social and environmental outcomes, but rather 
establish processes, such as environmental reporting standards, that may 
be conducive to improving performance. Third, management systems, such 
as the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14001 regime,98 
provide frameworks for organisations to manage routinely their environmental 
and social impacts. For example, a management system could create a process 
for an organisation to improve an aspect of its operations, such as its energy 
consumption, and thereby to reduce its environmental footprint. The fourth 
and fi nal key modality of governance is comparative evaluation mechanisms, 
whereby external entities evaluate and rank corporate sustainability performance 
for the SRI industry. These rating mechanisms include SRI stock market indexes 
such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes99 and the London Stock Exchange’s 
FTSE4Good Index Series.100
The main advantages of the new SRI codes would appear to be their ability to 
create a framework for coordinated action on common concerns, to provide a 
forum for exchange of information and best practices, and to build a network for 
peer pressure to minimise unscrupulous and unethical fi nancing. These effects 
are quite possible given that some of the codes have been well subscribed to: the 
UNPRI, for example, boasted at least 360 signatories managing approximately 
US$14 trillion as of mid-2008.101 Sixty-fi ve of the UNPRI signatories at this 
date were Australian fi nancial institutions.102 The most successful voluntary 
codes have been those that set standards for corporate social and environmental 
disclosures, which help social investors to differentiate companies’ sustainability 
performance. One such code is the Carbon Disclosure Project (‘CDP’), a 
mechanism that coordinates requests from institutional investors for information 
94 See BankTrack, Collevecchio Declaration: The Role and Responsibility of Financial Institutions 
(2003) <http://www.banktrack.org/download/collevecchio_declaration_with_signatories/030401_
collevecchio_declaration_with_signatories.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
95 See PRI Secretariat, above n 24.
96 See EPFI, above n 6.
97 See Global Reporting Initiative (‘GRI’), What Is GRI? (2009) <http://www.globalreporting.org/
AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI> at 15 October 2009.
98 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14001:2004 (2009) <http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_
catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=31807> at 17 October 2009. See also 
Frank Montabon et al, ‘ISO 14000: Assessing Its Perceived Impact on Corporate Performance’ (2000) 
36(2) Journal of Supply Chain Management 4.
99 See SAM Indexes GmbH, Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (2006) <http://www.sustainability-index.
com> at 15 October 2009.
100 See FTSE, FTSE4Good Index Series (2009) FTSE <http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_
Series/index.jsp> at 15 October 2009.
101 UNEP FI and UN Global Compact, PRI: Report on Progress 2008 (2008) 2.
102 Corporate Monitor, above n 21, 20.
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on companies’ climate change-related activities such as their greenhouse gas 
emissions.103 By mid-2009, over 5000 corporations worldwide have been asked to 
report to the CDP, on behalf of nearly 400 investment institutions.104
Many commentators and policymakers remain sceptical of corporate intentions, 
and doubt that voluntary mechanisms can provide a credible means of 
environmental or social regulation.105 An extensive literature has theorised the 
drift to corporate self-regulation and the motivations behind the proliferation 
of various corporate codes of conduct, which does not need to be duplicated 
here.106 Many of these SRI codes appear too ambiguous and open-ended in their 
expectations. They lack substantive standards on social justice or ecological 
integrity. The most demanding SRI standards are contained in the Collevecchio 
Declaration on Financial Institutions, drafted by civil society institutions, which 
has been largely ignored by mainstream investment institutions.
They favour more discretionary and procedure-based standards, dealing 
with disclosure, reporting, and auditing of investment activities. While these 
transparency measures have some benefi cial effects, they appear unlikely to 
induce major changes in investors’ underlying goals. Information on pollution 
or human rights violations must compete for attention in a crowded fi eld with 
often seemingly more pressing and tangible concerns. Voluntary mechanisms 
also typically lack credible sanctions or enforcement codes, whereby compliance 
has come to depend on peer pressure, the discipline of the market or sustained 
pressure from NGOs (non-governmental organisations). The corporate stone-
walling of the more stringent draft United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights107 poignantly illustrates the attitudes of some businesses to 
regulatory standards with teeth.108
2    The Equator Principles
The Equator Principles (‘Principles’) will be examined here to illustrate the nature 
and implementation of one of these SRI codes. Furthermore, as the ANZ Bank 
is a signatory to the Principles it is worth considering how they are applied in 
103 See Carbon Disclosure Project (‘CDP’), Carbon Disclosure Project: Home (2009) CDP <http://www.
cdproject.net> at 15 October 2009.
104 CDP, How to Disclose (2009) CDP <http://www.cdproject.net/faqs.asp> at 15 October 2009.
105 See, eg, Ian Maitland, ‘The Limits of Business Self-regulation’ (1995) 27 California Management 
Review 132.
106 See, eg, Stepan Wood, ‘Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability’ in Benjamin J Richardson 
and Stepan Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (2006) 229; Robert Gibson (ed), Voluntary 
Initiatives: The New Politics of Corporate Greening (1999); Jeremy Moon, ‘The Firm as Citizen? Social 
Responsibility of Business in Australia’ (1995) 30 Australian Journal of Political Science 1.
107 United Nations Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, UN ESCOR, 55th sess, Annex, UN Doc E/CN 4/2003/12 (2003) (‘Norms’). 
108 David Kinley, Justine Nolan and Natalie Zerial, ‘The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Refl ections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 30.
Can Socially Responsible Investment Provide a Means of Environmental Regulation? 279
relation to a specifi c environmental controversy. The Principles provide lenders 
with a framework to manage the social and environmental impacts associated 
with projects, such as dams, factories and mines, which the lenders fi nance.109 
Formulated mainly by the banking industry under the auspices of the World 
Bank’s International Finance Corporation (‘IFC’), the Principles target private, 
commercial lending, especially in developing countries and emerging economies 
where competent environmental regulation may be lacking. Motivated to evade 
both public criticism of their support of controversial projects and the loss of 
business to less scrupulous lenders, a cohort of banks has sought to level the 
playing fi eld for responsible project fi nancing by drafting the Principles.110 The 
credibility of the Principles is boosted by involving the IFC, the World Bank’s 
private-sector lending arm.
The Principles are not entirely self-contained standards, but incorporate references 
to the IFC’s Safeguard Policies for Social and Environmental Impact Assessment 
(‘SEIA’), forestry, dam safety, indigenous peoples and other topics. The Principles 
were released in June 2003111 and revised in July 2006.112 All signatories pledge 
to provide loans only to borrowers who conform to the Principles. The Principles 
apply to projects with a total capital cost of at least US$10 million (US$50 million 
before the 2006 revisions).113 They require lenders to rate projects that they plan to 
fi nance based on the magnitude of potential impacts and risks in accordance with 
the screening criteria of the IFC.114 These criteria categorise projects as A, B, or C 
(high, medium, and low respectively), depending on their potential environmental 
and social impacts. A or B project borrowers must undertake a SEIA based on 
IFC standards to address the issues identifi ed in the screening process. Project-
fi nancing banks must also prepare an Action Plan based on the conclusions of the 
SEIA.115 For category C projects, no further assessment is required beyond the 
initial screening.
Lenders of category A and B projects must also ensure that the borrower has 
consulted with affected local communities ‘in a structured and culturally 
appropriate manner’.116 This requirement falls short of the ‘prior informed consent’ 
standard demanded by indigenous peoples and other vulnerable communities, 
as refl ected in some international legal instruments.117 However, the Principles 
apply higher transparency and accountability standards than some other SRI 
109 Timothy O’Riordan, ‘Converting the Equator Principles to Equator Stewardship’ (2005) 47(4) 
Environment 1. 
110 Natasha Affolder, ‘Cachet Not Cash: Another Sort of World Bank Group Borrowing’ (2006) 14 
Michigan State Journal of International Law 141, 156.
111 See EPFI, above n 6.
112 See Elisa Morgera, ‘Signifi cant Trends in Corporate Environmental Accountability: The New 
Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation’ (2007) 18 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 151.
113 EPFI, above n 6, 4.
114 Ibid 2 [1].
115 Ibid 3 [4]. 
116 Ibid [5].
117 Claire Charters, ‘Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 
22.
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codes such as the UNPRI. For example, proponents must make the SEIA report 
and Action Plan available in a local language for public comment, and these 
documents are subject to independent expert review.118 Project fi nancing must 
also include a ‘grievance mechanism’ to hear complaints ‘by individuals or groups 
from among project-affected communities’.119 Finally, prior to drawing on the 
loan, the borrower must covenant with the lender to implement an environmental 
management plan and to provide ongoing monitoring of any impacts.120
Given the banking sector’s hand in the design of the Principles, its embracement 
of them is unsurprising. As of April 2009, nearly 70 banks and related fi nancial 
institutions, accounting for over 85 percent of the global project fi nancing market, 
have signed the Principles.121 The signatories include three Australian banks – 
Westpac, the National Australia Bank and ANZ. However, the Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia (‘CBA’), the largest bank in Australia, has not signed the 
Principles yet.122 A study by the British law fi rm, Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer, 
concluded that the Principles ‘impact on the fi nancial market generally and their 
success in redefi ning banking considerations has been far greater than anyone 
could have predicted’.123 Through common standards and procedures for earlier 
and more granular risk assessment, the Principles have helped signatory banks 
to minimise the reputational risks associated with development projects that pose 
signifi cant social and environmental disruption. Subscription to the Principles 
offers public relations benefi ts to defl ect NGOs’ incessant scrutiny of lenders.124
The 2006 revisions to the Principles have improved their accountability, 
transparency, and enforceability, although weaknesses remain.125 A lender’s 
categorisation of a project or the scope of an SEIA or management plan cannot 
readily be challenged. The categorisation of a project is crucial, for it infl uences the 
types of environmental standards and procedures that would subsequently apply. 
Further, while affected groups may publicly comment on a SEIA or a proposed 
management plan, they cannot legally challenge its adequacy. Moreover, the very 
118 EPFI, above n 6, 4 [7].
119 Ibid 4 [6].
120 Ibid [8].
121 EPFI, Institutions Which Have Adopted the Equator Principles (2009) <http://www.equator-principles.
com> at 15 October 2009.
122 Ibid. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (‘CBA’) has an environmental policy, but it is much less 
comprehensive than the Equator Principles on environmental impact assessment and community 
consultation: see CBA, Commonwealth Bank of Australia Environmental Policy (2001) <http://www.
commbank.com.au/about-us/download-printed-forms/EnvironmentalPolicy_0808.pdf> at 15 October 
2009. The CBA website also details measures it purports to take to promote sustainability: CBA, 
Sustainability (2009) <http://www.commbank.com.au/about-us/our-company/sustainability/default.
aspx> at 15 October 2009. 
123 Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Banking on Responsibility (2005) <http://www.freshfi elds.com/
publications/pdfs/practices/12057.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
124 See Donald Schepers, ‘The Impact of NGO Network Confl ict on the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Strategies of Multinational Corporations’ (2006) 45 Business & Society 282.
125 Bill Baue, Revised Equator Principles Fall Short of International Best Practice for Project Finance 
(2006) Social Funds <http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article2055.html> at 15 October 
2009; Andreas Missbach, ‘The Equator Principles: Drawing the Line for Socially Responsible Banks? 
An Interim Review from an NGO Perspective’ (2004) 47 Development 78.
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formulation of the Principles tends to be vague, making it hard to hold fi nanciers 
to account on other standards.
Implementation of the Principles has received mixed reviews. BankTrack, an 
umbrella organisation of NGOs pooling their advocacy on fi nancial issues, has 
found various lapses.126 Conversely, a report by Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer 
suggests, more optimistically, that the Principles have led some Equator banks 
‘into more structured dialogue with stakeholders and NGOs about social and 
environmental aspects of their lending’.127 Several international project fi nancing 
deals have tested the credibility of the Principles. These include the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline project, to bring Caspian Sea oil to Western Europe,128 the 
Sakhalin II oil and gas project in Eastern Russia,129 and the Uruguayan pulp mills 
bordering Uruguay and Argentina.130 The latter project, fi nanced by Calyon and 
other lenders, has been particularly controversial, leading to litigation between 
these states in the International Court of Justice.131
3    Financing the Gunns Pulp Mill and the Equator Principles
The fi nancing of Gunns’s forestry project in northern Tasmania has also put the 
spotlight on the Equator Principles in an Australian context. According to Gunns, 
the A$1.4 billion project represents ‘the largest-ever investment by the private 
sector in Tasmania and the largest-ever investment within the forestry sector in 
Australia’.132 Gunns also describes it as the ‘world’s greenest pulp mill’, utilising 
international best practice environmental technologies and procedures.133 Various 
environmental organisations and community groups dispute these assertions, 
fearful in particular of intensifi cation of clear-cutting of Tasmania’s old-growth 
forests and dioxin emissions from the mill itself.134 Nonetheless, the prospect of 
increased investment, jobs and other economic benefi ts has contributed to both 
the Tasmanian and Commonwealth governments approving the project in 2007.135 
Suits brought by the WSI and Investors for the Future of Tasmania against 
126 Michelle Chan-Fishel, Unproven Principles: The Equator Principles at Year Two (2005). 
127 Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, above n 123, 10.
128 Johan Frijns, Equator Principles; Principles, Profi t or Just PR? (2004) BankTrack <http://www.
bankTrack.org/show/news/equator_principles_principles_profi ts_or_just_pr> at 15 October 2009.
129 Mike Bradshaw, ‘The “Greening” of Global Project Financing: The Case of the Sakhalin-II Offshore Oil 
and Gas Project’ (2007) 51 Canadian Geographer 255.
130 Machted Spek, Financing Pulp Mills: An Appraisal of Risk Assessment and Safeguard Procedures 
(2006) 57.
131 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Provisional Measures) [2006] ICJ Rep 135. 
132 Gunns Ltd, Bell Bay Pulp Mill: Frequently Asked Questions (2005) <http://www.gunnspulpmill.com.
au/faqs.php> at 15 October 2009. 
133 Gunns Ltd, Bell Bay Pulp Mill (2005) <http://www.gunnspulpmill.com.au> at 15 October 2009. 
134 See, eg, BankTrack, Gunns Pulp Mill Proposal – Tasmania (2008) <http://www.banktrack.org/show/
dodgydeals/gunns_pulp_mill_proposal_tasmania> at 15 October 2009; Tasmanians Against the Pulp 
Mill Inc, ‘Reports and Submissions on the Proposed Pulp Mill’, <http://tapvision.info/node/31> at 15 
October 2009; Richard Flanagan, ‘Out of Control: The Tragedy of Tasmania’s Forests’ (2007) 23 The 
Monthly 20.
135 ABC News, Govt Gives Green Light to Pulp Mill (2007) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/
stories/2007/10/04/2050653.htm> at 15 October 2009. The approval is subject to Gunns Ltd meeting 
various environmental and other conditions.
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the federal government, claiming that successive Ministers acted unlawfully 
according to the principles of judicial review by allowing the environmental 
assessment of the pulp mill to be fast-tracked, have been dismissed by the Federal 
Court.136
Apart from the offi cial imprimatur given to the project, the ANZ’s decision to 
shun Gunns’s project was all the more surprising given that it had been a long-
standing fi nancial backer of the company. ANZ was expected to be the lead 
fi nancier in a lending syndicate for the pulp mill. However, after conducting its 
own independent review of the proposal and following public outcry against the 
project, ANZ chose to discontinue its involvement with Gunns. ANZ issued a 
curt public statement, explaining that ‘[d]ue to client confi dentiality, we are not in 
a position to comment further on this decision’.137
The bank’s desire to avoid tainting its reputation by association with an 
environmentally controversial project almost certainly contributed to its stance. 
BankTrack had earlier written to ANZ regarding what it saw as the failure of 
the environmental assessment procedure to fulfi ll standards required by the 
Principles.138 In regard to the Principles, which the ANZ had adopted in December 
2006, it declared:
By adopting the Equator Principles, ANZ has voluntarily committed to 
fund only new projects that can be developed and operated according 
to sound social and environmental standards. The Principles are now 
considered global best practice for ensuring applicable project fi nance 
proposals meet these standards.139
The ANZ has several other policies relevant to corporate social responsibility, 
including an Environment Charter140 and a Forest Policy.141 The latter includes a 
promise to ‘require an environmental and social impact assessment’ of forestry 
proposals, but ANZ states that it may fi nance projects that bring environmental 
harm if ‘the socio-economic benefi ts can been [sic] demonstrated’.142
The lack of disclosure by the ANZ regarding how it has evaluated the Gunns 
project does not meet the Principles it pledges to follow. The ANZ explains in its 
offi cial policy that:
136 Wilderness Society Inc v Turnbull (2007) 66 FCR 154; The Investors for the Future of Tasmania Inc v 
Minister for Environment and Water Resources (2007) 98 ALD 659; Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister 
for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2009] FCA 330 (Unreported, Tracey J, 9 April 2009). 
137 ANZ, ANZ and Gunns Limited’s Proposed Bell Bay Pulp Mill (2008) <http://www.anz.com/aus/About-
ANZ/Corporate-Responsibility/pdf/ANZGunns.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
138 BankTrack, above n 134. 
139 ANZ, Equator Principles (2009) ANZ <http://www.anz.com/aus/values/environment/Equator.asp> at 
15 October 2009.
140 ANZ, ANZ Environment Charter (2005) <http://www.anz.com/aus/about/Environment/pdf/
Environment8pp_52394.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
141 ANZ, ANZ Social and Environmental Management Policy and Guideline for Forests (2008) <http://
www.anz.com/resources/b/5/b5666e004f22083d912fb36edaf3a73e/Forests-Biodiversity.pdf?CACHEI
D=6be2d2804f1d3ef4a5a6b558b54e5b8d> at 15 October 2009.
142 Ibid 3.
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We will report on the progress of our implementation of the Equator 
Principles, including numbers of transactions screened and how these 
transactions were categorised according to social and environmental 
impact, through our annual and interim Corporate Responsibility Reports 
and regular stakeholder communications.143
Neither the ANZ’s Corporate Responsibility Interim Report, released in mid-
2008,144 nor its most recent reports on its implementation of the Principles, sheds 
any light on how it has evaluated the Gunns project.145 Information is provided 
only in aggregate, summary form, which hardly allows for public scrutiny of the 
rigour of the bank’s assessments. That said, as the ANZ is declining rather than 
supporting the pulp mill, in this instance the lack of disclosure is not detrimental 
from an environmental perspective.
While the ANZ’s action alone did not halt the pulp mill, it certainly caused 
some inconvenience and cost to Gunns; the latter had to search for new fi nancial 
backers,146 which became much more diffi cult in the worsening global fi nancial 
recession of 2008. To make the costs of managing the project more manageable, in 
2009 Gunns was seeking a joint venture with another company.147 The availability 
of less scrupulous sources of fi nance or support (albeit perhaps on inferior terms) 
for environmentally problematic projects therefore could undermine the ability of 
ethical fi nanciers to promote SRI.
The activities of Chinese banks in project fi nancing in other contexts, for example, 
are already rousing environmental concern.148 The seriousness of this situation is 
refl ected in the former President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, publicly 
criticising Chinese banks for not following the World Bank’s example in adhering 
to environmental and human rights standards when lending to infrastructure 
projects in Africa.149 A global fi nancial market that allows fi rms to raise funds 
offshore has important implications for governing the SRI market.
143 ANZ, Equator Principles, above n 139.
144 ANZ, Corporate Responsibility Interim Report (2008) <http://www.anz.com/aus/About-ANZ/
Corporate-Responsibility/pdf/ForestsBiodiversity.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
145 ANZ, Equator Principles Half Year Report – March 2008 (2008) <http://www.anz.com/about-us/
corporate-responsibility/customers/responsible-business-lending/equator-principles/historical-
results/> at 15 October 2009; ANZ, Equator Principles Full Year Report – December 2006 – September 
2007 (2007) <http://www.anz.com/about-us/corporate-responsibility/customers/responsible-business-
lending/equator-principles/historical-results/> at 15 October 2009.
146 Nick Clark, ‘Gunns Reloads in Cash Hunt’, The Mercury (Hobart), 30 May 2008.
147 Matthew Denholm, ‘Gunns Close to Deal with Tassie Pulp Mill Partner’, The Australian (Sydney), 16 
April 2009, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25340259-5006788,00.html> at 16 
October 2009.
148 Michelle Chan-Fishel, Time to Go Green: Environmental Responsibility in the Chinese Banking Sector 
(2007).
149 Editorial, ‘Mr Wolfowitz and the Bank’, New York Times (New York), 2 January 2007, <http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/01/02/opinion/02tue1.html> at 16 October 2009.
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E    SRI Regulation
1    Holding Financial Institutions to Account
Given the limitations of the SRI market and its own codes of conduct, public 
regulation will surely be necessary if the fi nancial sector is to become an agent 
for sustainable development. Once presented as an alternative to governmental 
regulation, the SRI movement is already starting to concede the necessity of state 
intervention, such as reforms to corporate governance to facilitate shareholder 
activism, and corporate environmental reporting to enable investors to 
differentiate fi rms more readily on environmental performance.150 The fi nancial 
sector’s dependence on public policymaking is most acutely evident in the area of 
climate fi nance, which requires carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes imposed 
by governments to help price the cost of greenhouse gas emissions.151
Before examining how states are regulating the fi nancial sector to promote SRI, it 
is necessary to explain why the fi nancial sector should be accountable for the social 
and environmental problems associated with companies and projects it funds. 
The following argument has two inter-related components. First, it addresses 
the question of why fi nancial institutions should be required by policymakers 
to be mindful of the environmental impacts of activities they fi nance. Second, 
it considers why fi nanciers should sometimes be held accountable to a higher 
standard than the fi rms they fund. Why, for instance, should we expect the ANZ 
to forego fi nancing a pulp mill that would comply with offi cial regulation?
Admittedly, if we had ‘perfect’ environmental regulation of the front-line 
companies, such as Gunns, there would presumably be no need to worry about 
the decisions of their fi nanciers because all environmental costs and benefi ts 
would be accounted for. The cost of capital would fully refl ect environmental 
performance, with polluters incurring higher operational costs, and therefore 
competitive disadvantages in raising fi nance. In such a scenario, SRI would revert 
to its traditional role of deontological ethical investment, whereby individuals 
could choose to shun investment in activities they found personally morally 
objectionable, such as alcohol or gambling.
Such perfect regulation at the corporate operational level is rare. Some four 
decades of environmental law-making in the modern era has mitigated but has 
hardly ended humankind’s unsustainable path.152 Even countries with relatively 
advanced environmental law systems are challenged by the growing volume of 
cross-border investments in jurisdictions with much less rigorous legal standards. 
150 Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen Polluters, above n 10,
303-75.
151 See Sonia Labatt and Rodney White, Carbon Finance: The Financial Implications of Climate Change 
(2007); Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Climate Finance and Its Governance: Moving to a Low Carbon 
Economy through Socially Responsible Financing?’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 597.
152 Millennium Environmental Assessment, Living beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human Well-
being (Statement from the Board) (2005) <http://www.wri.org/publication/millennium-ecosystem-
assessment-living-beyond-our-means-natural-assets-and-human-we> at 15 October 2009.
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In the context of global fi nance, where investors in one jurisdiction can profi t 
from economic activities in another, it is imperative to have environmental law 
standards that target ‘wholesale’ decisions concerning future development, 
and thus environmental pressures, that arise. Those decisions are made in the 
fi nancial sector. Bringing fi nancial institutions to account could relieve pressure 
on conventional environmental laws by decreasing initiation of polluting 
developments. Ideally, such developments would never receive fi nance, or would 
have to be redesigned to meet sustainable development benchmarks in order to 
secure affordable fi nance.
A second reason to target fi nanciers directly is because their strategic economic 
position can be exploited to enable obstacles to market regulation identifi ed 
by systems theory to be reduced. Systems theory challenges the teleological 
interpretation of modern regulation, questioning claims that we can solve 
society’s complex and numerous environmental dilemmas through planned 
social intervention.153 Modern society is described as polycentric and acephalous: 
an assemblage of autonomous systems that have evolved in response to diverse 
functional needs. The systems include: the law, the market, the political system, 
and so on. There are no universal norms or supreme institutions that control the 
relationship between these systems. The various social systems are conceived 
as ‘autopoietic’ by Luhmann – each has developed its own operational codes, 
protocols, and other means of communication, and therefore can respond only to 
problems defi ned by its own terms.154 Thus, the legal subsystem communicates 
through rights, duties, and rules, whereas the lingua franca of the market is based 
on the norms of money, exchange, competition, and profi tability. Consequently, 
a regulatory prescription to the corporate sector to protect biological diversity, 
for instance, will presumably be interpreted and evaluated primarily from a 
cost-benefi t perspective congruent with market imperatives. This conception of 
social systems has led ‘refl exive law’ theorists such as Teubner to argue for a less 
ambitious role for the legal system, which jettisons complex command-and-control 
regulation from the ‘outside’ in favour of market-compatible policy instruments 
and mechanisms to encourage business self-regulation from ‘within’.155
The fi nancial sector, while part of the market system, also occupies a strategic 
boundary position between different systems. For example, lenders are crucial for 
implementing governments’ monetary policy on interest rates, and authorities’ 
money laundering controls work more effectively when banks are obliged 
to report suspicious transactions.156 Financiers can also be vehicles for ‘legal’ 
153 See Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication (John Bednarz trans, 1989 ed) [trans of Ökologische 
Kommunikation: Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf ökologische Gefährdungen einstellen?]; 
Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (1984).
154 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (John Bednarz Jr and Dirk Baecker trans, 1995 ed) 13, 147 [trans of 
Soziale Systeme]; Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Anne Bankowska and Ruth Adler 
trans, 1993 ed) [trans of Recht als Autopoietisches System].
155 Gunther Teubner, ‘The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution in Ecological Liability’ 
(1994) 16 Cardozo Law Review 429.
156 Alastair Brown, ‘Money Laundering: A European and UK Perspective’ (1997) 12 Journal of 
International Banking Law 307.
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communication, transmitting information about correct corporate environmental 
behaviour, such as where a lender’s own fi nancial interests are at stake due to 
a borrower’s risk of incurring liability for pollution costs. Jessop suggests that 
organisations straddling the boundaries of different social systems are potentially 
well placed to ‘enhance mutual understanding’ and ‘play a role in linking sub-
systems’.157 By holding strategic, intermediate positions between the state and 
corporate sector, fi nancial organisations could be harnessed as a means of 
environmental regulation, such as through requirements to promote SRI.158 Thus, 
to the extent that direct environmental regulation of the market is hindered, 
policymakers might be able to exploit the fi nancial institutions that increasingly 
dominate the economy.
A third reason to target the fi nancial sector, and even hold it accountable to higher 
standards than that applicable to the companies it funds, is the generally greater 
economic and environmental signifi cance of fi nancial institutions. The 2008 
sub-prime mortgage lending crisis in the US illustrates painfully how failings 
in one fi nancial sector can ripple through the international economy producing 
much more devastating impacts.159 Thus, apart from any environmental effects 
attributable to the fi nancial economy, many commentators have long argued 
on traditional economic policy grounds that banks and other fi nanciers should 
be controlled and monitored by regulators more closely.160 The fi nancial sector 
contains propagation mechanisms that can amplify initial, small shocks throughout 
the economy; insolvency of a bank usually has far greater ramifi cations for the 
economy than the collapse of a non-fi nancial company.161
A related fourth argument builds on the so-called ‘universal owner thesis’ 
advanced by Hawley and Williams. They herald institutional investors, such 
as large pension funds, as a new force for corporate responsibility.162 Hawley 
and Williams contend that these universal owners, investing broadly across 
the economy, are self-interested in the health and long-term sustainability of 
the entire economy. This is because, as economy-wide investors, they ‘have 
no interest in abetting behavior by any one company that yields a short-term 
boost while threatening harm to the economic system as a whole’.163 Acting as a 
universal investor implies that what is an ‘externality’ at the level of an individual 
company can result in a costly ‘internality’ for an investor’s global portfolio. 
In practice, however, there is much evidence that institutional investors do not 
invest responsibly; reliant on fund managers hired on limited-term contracts, 
157 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place (1990) 329.
158 Benjamin J Richardson, Environmental Regulation through Financial Organisations (2002).
159 R Christopher Whalen, ‘The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences’ (Policy Brief No 2008-
PB-04, Networks Financial Institute, 2008); George Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: 
The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means (2008).
160 Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks. A Financial Stability Perspective (2006); 
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara, ‘The Corporate Governance of Banks’ (2003) 9(1) Economic 
Policy Review 91.
161 Some non-fi nancial corporations of course are extremely economically signifi cant, and their collapse 
would produce wide-ranging economic effects. The motor vehicle industry is an example.
162 James Hawley and Andrew Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism (2000).
163 Davis, Lukomnik and Pitt-Watson, above n 87, 18.
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their investment strategies are often short-term and speculative.164 As they 
commonly hold assets on behalf of millions of investors, such as pension plan 
members, whose investment portfolios are closely tied to the overall health of 
the economy, these universal investors should be required to take a long-term, 
holistic perspective of their investments including taking account of any social or 
ecological impacts that could hurt fi nancial returns.
Finally, and perhaps ultimately, the most basic reason for targeting fi nanciers 
is simply that, in deriving profi ts from funding companies engaged in 
environmentally degrading and socially harmful activities, they can also be 
considered accountable. These unseen polluters should be unveiled for their 
contribution to unsustainable development. Capital fi nancing is instrumental to 
development choices; those who enable, and benefi t from, those choices through 
fi nancial investment must also share in the responsibility. Financial institutions 
have evolved to mobilise capital and to facilitate fi nancial returns for investors. 
Anyone who has ever inquired at a bank about a personal loan, credit card or 
mortgage, will understand that fi nancial institutions do not want their capital idly 
sitting around. To quote a well-known aphorism: ‘money does not grow on trees’. 
Rather, money has to be actively managed and reinvested to generate profi t. This 
pervasive drive to put capital to use, to make more capital, invariably creates a 
process that fuels widespread social and environmental changes. It also creates a 
reason to hold fi nanciers legally accountable.
2    SRI Regulatory Reforms for Sustainability
Legal reforms to promote SRI in Australia and other countries have quickened 
since 2000, although generally they have mostly just tinkered with the operation 
of fi nancial markets. The measures range from regulating substantive investment 
criteria to, more commonly, regulating procedures that shape investment 
decision-making processes. Several interwoven factors have infl uenced these 
regulatory trends and preferences. Many Western countries including Australia 
are experiencing a realignment of the roles of the state and the market. The 
regulatory state has tended to morph towards a system of regulatory governance 
that concedes greater responsibilities and roles for market actors and, to a lesser 
extent, civil society institutions.165 Legal commentators have conceptualised 
some of these changes in terms of ‘mutual regulation’,166 ‘responsive regulation’,167 
‘smart regulation’,168 and ‘post-regulatory governance’.169 Paradoxically, however, 
164 Craig Mackenzie, ‘The Scope for Investor Action on Corporate Social and Environmental Impacts’ in 
Sullivan and Mackenzie (eds), above n 31, 20, 32-3, 37.
165 See generally Julia Black, ‘Critical Refl ections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 1. 
166 See Peter Simmons and Brian Wynne, State, Market and Mutual Regulation? Socioeconomic Dimensions 
of the Environmental Regulation of Business (1994).
167 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992).
168 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998).
169 Colin Scott, ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State’, in Jacint 
Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for 
the Age of Governance (2004) 145.
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there has also been some countervailing expansion of states’ legal capacity to 
correct market abuses and unresolved impacts.170 The recent turmoil in global 
fi nancial markets, which has exposed the hazards of some of these regulatory 
shifts, has generated further debate about the possible need to return to more 
stringent forms of command regulation of this sector.171
So far, SRI policy reforms have emphasised market-based and informational 
tools that alter the procedures and processes of SRI decision-making. These 
standards do not require additional policy consensus concerning defi nitions of 
‘ethical’ or ‘socially responsible’. Instead, they shape the way investments are 
selected and implemented, providing for greater transparency and accountability. 
By attempting to modify how fi nanciers view the environmental and social 
repercussions of their actions, process standards may stimulate changes in 
social values that contribute to sustainability.172 Refl exive law theorists contend 
that encouraging companies to refl ect and learn about their social impacts may 
sometimes exert greater long-term infl uence than regulating fi rms through 
coercion or rewards.173
Among these policy instruments are requirements for investment institutions to 
disclose their policies for SRI and for exercising their shareholder proxy votes. 
The most prominent transparency reforms have been introduced in the United 
Kingdom, several other European states and Australia, obliging occupational 
pension funds to disclose their SRI policies, if any.174 In 2001, the Commonwealth 
legislated for superannuation funds, mutual funds, and investment life insurance 
providers to disclose publicly their SRI policies (but the regulation does not oblige 
these funds to practise SRI).175 Also, an amendment to federal superannuation 
legislation in 2005176 has given fund contributors the right to choose where their 
monies are invested, thereby enabling socially conscious investors to switch 
to one of the burgeoning green and ethical funds. Another reform, adopted in 
Canada and the US, requires mutual funds to disclose their shareholding proxy 
voting policies and voting records.177 Its purpose is to discourage fund managers 
from passively colluding with corporate management, and through a more active 
170 John Cioffi , ‘Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance 
Capitalism in the United States and Germany’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 533.
171 See, eg, International Monetary Fund, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial 
Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management (2009).
172 David Case, ‘Changing Corporate Behavior through Environmental Management Systems’ (2006) 31 
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 7.
173 See Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer and Declan Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-regulation (1994).
174 See, eg, Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005 (UK) cl 2(3)(b)(vi)-(3)(c); 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1013D(1)(l); France’s Projet de Loi sur L’Épargne Salariale n° 2001-
152 (19 February 2001) arts 21, 23.
175 Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), as incorporated into the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
s 1013D(1). The regulation however does not require these funds to have an SRI policy, only to disclose 
any policy adopted.
176 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2005 (Cth).
177 Securities Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by 
Registered Management Investment Companies (2003); Canadian Securities Administrators, National 
Instrument 81-106 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure and Companion Policy 81-106CP (2005).
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proxy process to improve the quality of corporate governance. Research on 
implementation of some of these standards reveals shortcomings.178 Mandated 
disclosures often entail vague, boilerplate statements that do not illuminate the 
methodology behind SRI decisions or their implementation.179 Process standards 
have rarely extended to democratising investment policymaking, which remains 
dominated by fund managers, investment analysts and other experts.180 Modern 
corporate and investment regulation has long been premised on investors playing 
the role of ‘passive capital’ which ‘declines participation in, or is excluded from, 
management of the business’.181
Mandatory SRI standards are rare. Some governments have banned specifi c 
undesirable investments, as an adjunct to primary controls. Belgium, for 
example, prohibits investments in companies that produce or distribute cluster 
bombs.182 Another example is the bans instituted by some US states on pension 
fund investments in Sudan, presently associated with extensive human rights 
atrocities.183 Obligations to actively promote SRI appear confi ned to public 
pension funds, with reforms adopted in France, New Zealand, Norway and 
Sweden. New Zealand’s Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 
requires the guardians of the national superannuation fund to invest in such a way 
as to avoid ‘prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of 
the world community’,184 and to publish a statement of investment standards and 
procedures that ‘must cover … ethical investment, including policies, standards, 
or procedures for avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible 
member of the world community’.185 The open-ended, discretionary nature of 
this standard however has contributed to its perfunctory implementation.186 The 
Swedish and Norwegian funds, on the other hand, are each guided by an ethics 
council, which uses internationally recognised standards for human rights and 
sustainable development as their benchmarks.187
Economic incentives to alter the cost-benefi t calculations of fi nanciers in favour of 
sustainable development choices have also been introduced in some jurisdictions. 
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The leading example is the Netherlands’ Green Project Directive,188 which – 
several studies suggest – has massively augmented the Dutch SRI market.189 
The scheme provides taxation deductions for investments in environmentally 
approved projects, such as wind farms and organic farms. Conversely, economic 
incentives can work to discourage the fi nancing of environmentally unsound 
projects. Imposing liability on lenders for pollution problems connected to their 
borrowers has been upheld by courts in the US under the ‘Superfund’ legislation; 
its drastic effects in dampening bank lending to the chemical industry contributed 
to modifi cation of the scheme in 1996 to limit lenders’ liability.190
Overall, however, these fi rst generation SRI governance reforms have yet 
to engineer systemic changes to global fi nancial markets to ensure that 
environmentally sustainable development is prioritised. Isolated success stories 
mask a more prevalent business-as-usual. Most SRI regulation was designed to 
avoid imposing burdensome regulatory costs on fi nancial markets. Indeed, the 
fi nancial industry has actively sought to thwart radical reforms. For instance, 
in 1996 the US banking industry successfully lobbied Congress to amend the 
‘Superfund’ legislation to obtain a safe harbour from lender liability suits for 
cleanup costs of contaminated lands.191 Also, the mutual fund industry in North 
America fi ercely resisted regulations to make them disclose how they vote as 
shareholders.192 In the United Kingdom and Australia, the pension fund sectors 
initially opposed or doubted proposed legislation to make them disclose publicly 
their policies on ethical investment.193 These vignettes generally reveal what 
really motivates many fi nancial institutions – an unencumbered market to be able 
to achieve the highest returns for their investors. More fundamental potential 
reforms, such as to the underlying fi duciary duties of investment institutions, 
remain unaddressed.194 The tension between encouraging fi nanciers to be mindful 
of the public interest while requiring them to promote the private economic 
interests of their benefi ciaries has not been satisfactorily addressed.
188 The scheme was revamped and extended in 2002 and 2005: Netherlands Government, Regeling 
Groenprojecten Buitenland 2002, Staatscourant, 2 January 2002, n° 1, 31; Netherlands Government, 
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profi t_tcm24-196677.pdf> at 15 October 2009.
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110 Stat 3009.
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The dominant response of the SRI movement to this tension has been to recast 
SRI into a business case, whereby social and environmental issues are defi ned not 
as ethical imperatives, but rather as fi nancial risks and opportunities that prudent 
fi duciaries should observe. Of course, that environmental care and business 
success can be compatible is not an objectionable proposition, in principle. 
Financiers should benefi t from companies that reduce their ecological footprint. 
However, the exuberance behind this synergy has become for some fi nanciers an 
excuse to just tinker with unsustainable modes of development. Fundamentally, 
business case SRI is patently no assurance to safeguarding the planet, given 
that the market cannot valuate many social and environmental qualities, but 
discounts the future and the countervailing short-term business case to profi t 
from unsustainable practices.195
III    CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE REFORMS
For the foreseeable future, however we may interpret the ANZ’s seemingly 
benevolent stance to protect Tasmania’s forests from a giant pulp mill, any claims 
that an SRI revolution in Australia or elsewhere is underway are unsubstantiated.196 
It is probably an aberration. The institutional and economic barriers to the SRI 
market remain entrenched and the core legal standards to which fi nanciers are 
held to account remain unaltered. So, what could policymakers do to make SRI 
more widespread in Australian or international fi nancial markets? While the 
answer requires another article of much longer length, some basic strategies can 
be outlined briefl y.
First, the fi duciary duties of institutional investors should be reformed to ensure 
that the public costs of private investment are accounted for. Fiduciary duties, 
which govern how fi nancial decision-makers manage the assets of benefi ciary 
investors, hardly license ethical investment for sustainable development. The core 
duties of loyalty and prudence understandably encourage investment policies that 
prioritise the maximisation of fi nancial returns for benefi ciaries to the exclusion of 
collateral impacts and the interests of other stakeholders.197 The World Economic 
Forum has thus recommended that authorities ‘[m]odify pension fi duciary 
rules which discourage or prohibit explicit trustee consideration of social and 
environmental aspects of corporate performance’.198 A study on capital markets 
undertaken by Stratos Inc for Canada’s National Round Table on the Environment 
and the Economy concluded: ‘current interpretations of the fi duciary duties of 
pension fund managers might unnecessarily constrain their ability to address 
195 For these and other problems with markets, see John McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism (1998); 
Herman Daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development (1996); AnnMari Jansson et 
al (eds), Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological Economics Approach to Sustainability (1994).
196 See Oliver Wagg, Project Finance – Equator Principles Case Study: ANZ Shot in Foot by Blasting 
Gunns (2008) Ethical Corporation <http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=5997&rss=ec-
main.xml> at 15 October 2009.
197 Thornton, above n 14.
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the full range of relevant corporate responsibility considerations related to 
prospective investments’.199 Conversely, reports commissioned by UNEP FI in 
2005 and 2009 have suggested that SRI is not precluded or overly hampered by 
fi duciary duties.200 However, these studies defi ned SRI in terms of the prevailing 
business case approach, which understandably can be reconciled with fi duciary 
duties given that it considers social and environmental issues only to the extent 
that they are fi nancially ‘material’. 
Knowing that fi duciary duties hinder SRI is relatively straightforward – the 
most diffi cult task is to redefi ne intelligently fi duciary standards in a way that 
can promote sustainable development while holding fi nancial decision-makers 
measurably accountable. Fiduciary duties for sustainable investment may be 
redefi ned along a spectrum of ever-increasing exactitude. At the most liberal end 
of the spectrum, fi duciary duties could merely explicitly authorise fi duciaries to 
consider those social and environmental factors which they view as fi nancially 
material. Arguably, this business case approach is already allowable – indeed 
essential if environmental risks jeopardise short-term returns. Some jurisdictions 
have already tinkered with reforms in this direction. For instance, Connecticut 
legislation provides that controllers of the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds may consider the environmental and social implications of investments, 
but it does not stipulate on what grounds they should do so.201 The Canadian 
province of Manitoba provides a further example. In 1995, Manitoba’s Trustee 
Act was amended to permit trustees to consider non-fi nancial criteria in their 
investment policies, so long as ‘the trustee exercises the judgment and care that a 
person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in administering 
the property of others’.202 The limitation of a discretionary fi duciary standard 
is that it does not oblige consideration of social or environmental impacts. Nor 
does it allow affected third parties to enforce their interests. There is a difference 
between taking the interests of various parties into account and owing a duty to 
those parties.
The preference among law-makers and market actors to frame fi duciary 
responsibility concerning environmental issues purely in terms of fi nancial 
‘risks’ can be seen in relation to the broader trend of risk-based regulation that 
has emerged in many countries in recent years.203 Such regulatory approaches 
incorporate cost-benefi t analysis and other techniques that seek to make decisions 
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more ‘objective’ and defensible, to reduce uncertainties, and to contribute to 
effi cient and effective use of regulatory resources.204 In the fi nancial sector, risk 
management is the primary lens through which regulators seek to supervise 
investment and other fi nancial decisions.205 By framing ‘risk’ in ways that expose 
or obscure certain issues, impacts and interests, the architects of such risk-based 
governance regimes seek to contrive limits to their own responsibility and therefore 
their own accountability. Consequently, risk-based regulation serves ‘to defi ne 
what are acceptable “failures” and what are not, and thus to defi ne the parameters 
of blame’.206 For SRI, a system of fi duciary fi nance in which responsibility is 
conceived narrowly in terms of fi nancial risks is no assurance of sustainable 
development. It would serve to limit drastically the public accountability of 
investment institutions given that so much environmental harm or benefi t is not 
captured by such economic metrics. Hopefully, the spate of worldwide scandals 
in the fi nancial sector in 2008 and 2009 that has shorn risk-based regulation in 
this sector of some of its allure207 may open possibilities for other approaches to 
governing investment decision-making.
Among alternative approaches, fi duciaries could be obliged by legislation to 
act for sustainable development or a similar general performance standard. The 
diffi culty would be to design a performance standard with suffi cient clarity 
to make fi duciaries accountable. Vaguely worded stipulations for fi nancial 
institutions to ‘promote sustainability’ would surely not suffi ce. They would be 
vulnerable to being usurped by discretionary interpretations to which fi nanciers 
could not be held accountable. One solution could be to utilise the considerable 
advances in designing sustainable performance indicators in other fi elds.208 One 
such indicator is the carbon footprint of an investment portfolio – one of the most 
potent indicators of environmental performance.209 The SRI industry already 
makes extensive use of sustainability performance standards in evaluating and 
comparing potential investments – the challenge would be to extend such standards 
to the fi nancial industry itself.210 Under a reformed standard, fi duciary investors 
could remain legally accountable to only their fund members or shareholders, but 
they could only maximise fi nancial returns so long as they respect sustainability 
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criteria. Yet, because what is ‘sustainable’ is often a very context-specifi c 
judgment, with reference to a certain time and place, this approach is not without 
limitations for some environmental criteria. A less prescriptive approach would 
be to expect fi nanciers to adhere to a general ‘reasonableness’ standard, which 
could be embellished with prophylactic rules such as a requirement to conduct 
an environmental impact study or consult with affected third parties if local 
environmental laws are inadequate to ensure sustainable development.
Apart from fi duciary duties, reform is needed to address the global scale of 
fi nancial markets. Parallel sustainability standards must be etched into the 
international legal rules governing cross-border fi nance. The existing range of 
voluntary international standards such as the UNPRI or Equator Principles fall 
short of meeting the exacting standards required. International fi nancial market 
regulation also currently ignores the social and environmental dimensions of 
capital markets – indeed, the recent global fi nancial woes illustrate the lack of 
effective international regulation on even some of the most elementary fi nancial 
management issues.211
New international rules would presumably have several advantages. For one, 
they would minimise a race to the bottom, as level standards would dissuade 
capital from fl eeing to the most regulatorily benign markets.212 Further, some 
institutional investors in global markets may even welcome some standardisation 
of SRI norms, as having to contend with different rules in different markets 
increases compliance costs. Of course, the corporate hostility to the proposed 
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights also illustrates 
the likely political obstacles to such reforms.213 On the other hand, the current 
global fi nancial crisis provides a rare opportunity to forge a new Bretton Woods-
type scale of reforms that could include standards conducive to SRI, such as 
mandatory disclosures of social and environmental risks, reforms to fi nancial 
accounting to incorporate social accounting metrics, and even standards for 
democratising investment fund governance to widen the range of stakeholder 
voices in investment decisions. Regulatory theorists such as Julia Black have 
nonetheless cautioned that transnational governance regimes face acute challenges 
in achieving adequate accountability and legitimacy to enable them to govern 
effectively.214 These problems tend to be greatest for non-state transnational 
governance mechanisms such as the Equator Principles, for which ‘[t]here is no 
one organization which is responsible for issuing the principles, interpreting or 
revising them’.215 Rather, the Equator banks are effectively policing themselves, 
which threatens the credibility and integrity of the Principles. Mechanisms that 
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can enable other actors to coordinate public consultation and reporting, and to 
ensure redress, are thus among the strategies that can boost the accountability 
and thus legitimacy of international reforms to promote SRI.
These and other conceivable reforms may seem far-fetched, but with a looming 
planetary environmental crisis, more radical and bitter alternatives may one day 
be contemplated if we do not bring the fi nancial sector into the environmental 
debate now. These are not challenges unique to Australia or any other country, 
although in each jurisdiction there will be context-specifi c legal and policy 
challenges to governing SRI. Until then, SRI will likely remain a small, niche 
sector of the fi nancial economy, unable to greatly infl uence the environmental 
practices of companies.
